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Crimes
Crimes; children in pornography
Labor Code §§1309.5, 1309.6 (new); Penal Code §§311.2, 311.4, 311.9
(amended).
AB 1580 (Ellis); STATS 1977, Ch 1061
(Effective September 24, 1977)
Support: California District Attorneys Association; California Peace Offi-
cers' Association
SB 817 (Presley); STATS 1977, Ch 1148
(Effective September 29, 1977)
Support: California Attorney General; California Peace Officers' Asso-
ciation; Motion Picture Associaton of America
Opposition: California Attorney's for Criminal Justice
The use of children as subjects in pornographic materials is increasing at
an alarming rate, and it has been estimated that 30,000 cases of child and
teenage molestation and child pornography will have occurred in 1977 in
Los Angeles County alone [CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 1148, §6 at -]. Further-
more, hundreds of different magazines, books, directories, and films deal-
ing in "kidi-porn" are currently available either on the open market, or
under the counter [R. LLOYD, FOR LOVE OR MONEY: BOY PROSITUTION iN
AMERICA 226 (1976)]. In response to the seriousness of this situation, the
legislature has enacted two new laws [CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 1061; CAL.
STATS. 1977, c. 1148] that are apparently aimed at curtailing "a recent and
frightening phenomenon, the criminal and sexual exploitation of children in
pornography" [See Hearings on Children in Pornography Before the
California Senate Select Committee on Children and Youth, April 1, 1977,
at 4 (testimony of Joseph Freitas, District Attorney, San Francisco
County)].
Prior to enactment of Chapters 1061 and 1148, there were only two
misdemeanor provisions of law that dealt directly with the problem of
children in pornography [CAL. STATS. 1961, c. 2147, §5, at 4428 (use of a
minor in the distribution, production, and exhibition of obscene matter);
CAL. LAB. CODE §1308(a)(3) (using a minor under the age of 16 for obscene
or immoral purposes)]. Chapter 1148 adds provisions to the Labor Code to
require all retailers and persons who knowingly sell or distribute for resale,
any material that they know, or reasonably should know, depicts a minor
under the age of 16 engaged in "sexual conduct" to maintain records
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containing the names and addresses of the persons from whom they obtained
this material [CAL. LAB. CODE §1309.5(a), (b)]. "Sexual conduct" as used
in Section 1309.5 of the Labor Code includes, whether actual or simulated:
sexual or anal intercourse; oral copulation; anal oral copulation; masturba-
tion; bestiality; sexual sadism or masochism; or excretory functions or any
other sexual activity performed in a lewd or lascivious manner [CAL. PENAL
CODE §311.4(c)]. These records must be kept for a period of three years
after acquisition of the governed material [CAL. LAB. CODE §1309.5(a),
(b)]. The failure to maintain these records, or the disclosure of such records
by law enforcement officers, except in the performance of their duties, is a
misdemeanor [CAL. LAB. CODE §1309.5(c)] and carries a maximum civil
penalty of $5,000 [CAL. LAB. CODE §1309.6(a)]. Section 311.4 of the Penal
Code provides that it is a misdemeanor to knowingly use a minor in the
preparation, publication, distribution, or exhibition of "obscene matter"
[CAL. PENAL CODE §311.4(a)]. Chapter 1148 has also amended Section
311.4 to provide that it is a felony to knowingly use, employ, induce, or
coerce a minor under the age of 16, or for the parent or guardian having
control over such a minor to knowingly permit the minor to engage in the
above specified sexual conduct in the preparation of any film or photograph,
or live performance, for a commercial purpose [CAL. PENAL CODE
§311.4(b)]. Violation of these provisions is punishable by imprisonment in
the state prison for three, four, or five years [CAL. PENAL CODE §311.4(b)].
Section 311.2 of the Penal Code, with certain exceptions for projection-
ists and other employees of persons licensed by a city or county, makes it a
misdemeanor to possess, prepare, publish, or print, with the intent to
distribute or exhibit to others, or offer to distribute, distribute, or exhibit to
others "obscene matter." [CAL. PENAL CODE §311.2(a), (c), (d)]. Chapter
1061 has added a new provision to Section 311.2 to make the above
described conduct a felony if such conduct is performed for commercial
consideration, and involves "obscene matter" that depicts a minor under
the age of 18 simulating or actually engaging in sexual intercourse, mastur-
bation, sodomy, bestiality, or oral copulation. Violation of this new provi-
sion is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four
years and/or a fine of $50,000 [CAL. PENAL CODE §311.2(b)]. Thus, in an
effort to halt the proliferation of "kidi-porn" in this state, it appears that the
legislature has directed these changes in the law not only at the publication
of film depicting children engaging in specified sexual activity, but also at
those who actually use a minor, or permit a minor to be used in the
production of obscene matter [See CAL. PENAL CODE §§311.2(b),
311.4(b)].
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COMMENT
Section 311.2 of the Penal Code prohibits the publication, with the intent
to distribute to others, of "obscene matter" depicting a minor under the age
of 18 engaging in or simulating specified sex acts [CAL. PENAL CODE
§311.2(b)]. This provision does not, however, prohibit the publication of
all matter depicting minors engaged in such sexual activity, unless it can be
established that the magazine or film constitutes "obscene matter" under
California law [See CAL. PENAL CODE §311.2(b)]. Section 311 of the Penal
Code defines "obscene matter" as that which: taken as a whole, has, to
average adults under contemporary standards, or to a clearly defined sexual-
ly deviant group, a predominant appeal to the prurient interest; clearly
exceeds the customary limits of candor; and "is utterly without redeeming
social importance" [CAL. PENAL CODE §311 (emphasis added)].
In contrast, the federal, constitutionally compelled standard for declaring
matter obscene is the so-called "Miller test" set down by the United States
Supreme Court in Miller v. California [413 U.S. 15 (1973)]. In that case,
the Court reaffirmed the proposition that obscene matter does not fall within
the constitutionally protected area of the first amendment [id. at 23]. The
Court in Miller established a tripartite test to determine whether the matter
in question was obscene, and thus not protected:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary commu-
nity standards" would find that the work,' taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest [citation omitted]; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. [Id. at 24 (emphasis added)].
Nevertheless, the California definition of "obscene matter," which requires
the prosecutor to establish that the material in question is "utterly without
redeeming social importance," is constitutional since the first amendment,
as construed by the United States Supreme Court in Miller, does not require
states to lower the prosecutorial burden of proof [Bloom v. Municipal
Court, 16 Cal. 3d 71, 77, 545 P.2d 229, 232-33, 127 Cal. Rptr. 317, 320-21
(1976)].
Section 311.4 of the Penal Code prohibits the employment or use of a
minor under the age of 16 in the preparation of a film or photograph, for
commercial purposes, in which the minor engages in, among other things,
"any lewd or lascivious sexual activity." Although this provision indirectly
prohibits publication of such material, thus raising the spectre that the above
quoted provision may be unconstitutionally vague under Miller [See Eagle
Books, Inc. v. Reinhard, 418 F. Supp. 345, 347-50 (N.D. Ill.) (1974)], it is
quite conceivable that a court would find the provisions of Section 311.4 to
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be a constitutionally permissible exercise of the state's power to regulate the
"well-being of its children" without ever reaching the first amendment
question [See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944); cf.
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 634 (1968) (restricting minors' right
to view pornographic material)]. Both Section 311.2 and Section 311.4
proscribe conduct that simulates specified sexual activity as well as actual
sexual activity. Although the United States Supreme Court apparently has
yet to address this issue, a California court has held that simulated sexual
intercourse can constitute "hard-core pornography" and thus is not con-
stitutionally protected speech or press [People v. Cimber, 271 Cal. App. 2d
Supp. 867, 870, 76 Cal. Rptr. 382, 384 (1969)]. Therefore, the amend-
ments to Sections 311.2 and 311.4 of the Penal Code appear to be consistent
with the requirements of the first amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.
A significant problem area in the new law, however, appears to be the
requirement that retailers and wholesalers of any material depicting minors
under the age of 16 engaged in specified sexual conduct, maintain records of
the names and addresses of the persons from whom the matter was obtained
[CAL. LAB. CODE §1309.5(a) (b)]. Inasmuch as it is a felony to distribute, or
possess with intent to distribute, material depicting minors under the age of
18 engaged in or simulating specified sexual activity, if such material is
obscene under California law [CAL. PENAL CODE §311.2(b)], the require-
ment that these retailers and wholesalers maintain records might arguably
constitute compelled "testimonial self-incrimination" in violation of the
fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. The United States Su-
preme Court has construed the term "testimony" to mean not only speech
but also acts, implicit in which are statements or admissions [Fisher v.
United States, 325 U.S. 391, 410-11 (1976)]. Consequently, it is arguable
that the act of keeping records pursuant to Section 1309.5 of the Labor Code
involves implicit testimony that the individual who maintains these records
is probably committing a felony, the distribution of obscene matter depict-
ing minors engaged in specified sexual conduct [Compare CAL. PENAL
CODE §311.2(b) with CAL. LAB. CODE §1309.5(a)-(b)]. From this premise it
is conceivable that a court reviewing the provisions of Section 1309.5 may
find these record keeping requirements to constitute "'real and appreciable,'
hazards of self-incrimination" [Compare CAL. LAB. CODE §1309.5(a)-(b)
with Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48 (1968)].
In Albertson v. SACB [382 U.S. 70 (1966)], the United States Supreme
Court suggested, in effect, that if a regulation is directed "at a highly
selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities" and if compliance
with the regulation might involve the individual "in the admission of a
crucial element of a crime," then that regulation is violative of the individu-
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al's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination [Id. at 79]. While there
do not appear to be any United States Supreme Court cases directly on point,
it would seem that the record keeping requirement of Labor Code Section
1309.5 is somewhat analogous to the issues considered by the Court in the
Albertson case. It is arguable that this record keeping requirement might
constitute compelled "testimonial self-incrimination" amounting to the
admission of a crime, and, therefore, may be unconstitutional [Compare
CAL. LAB. CODE §1309.5(a), (b) and CAL. PENAL CODE §311.2 with Byers
v. California, 402 U.S. 424, 427-31 (1971), Haynes v. United States,
390 U.S. 85, 95-100 (1968), Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 64-
69 (1968), Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48-49 (1968) and
Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70, 77-79 (1966)]. The apparent unconstitu-
tionality of Labor Code Section 1309.5, however, will not affect any other
provisions of the new law, since Chapter 1148 provides that its provisions
are severable [Cal. Stats. 1977, c. 1148, §4, at-]. In summary, although
the provisions of the new law appear to be consistent with the requirements
of the first amendment, the record keeping requirement of Labor Code
Section 1309.5 is arguably violative of the fifth amendment.
See Generally:
1) Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
2) B. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Crimes Against Decency and Morals §§550-52 (obscenity
and related offenses) (Supp. 1975).
Crimes; terrorist threats
Penal Code §§422, 422.5 (new).
SB 923 (Carpenter); STATS 1977, Ch 1146
Support: California Peace Officers' Association; Pacific Gas and Electric
Company; San Francisco Board of Supervisors
Opposition: California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1146, it was unclear under what
conditions the communication of terrorist threats was unlawful [See, e.g.
CAL. PENAL CODE §§69, 71, 95, 136, 148.1]. Modelled after the Model
Penal Code [MODEL PENAL CODE §211.3, (Proposed Official Draft, 1962)]
and the Brown Commission Report [NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED.
CRIM. LAWS, FINAL REPORT OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED.
CRIM. LAWS §1614 (1971)], Chapter 1146 adds Sections 422 and 422.5 to
the Penal Code to make it a felony to willfully threaten to commit certain
crimes under specified circumstances [CAL. PENAL CODE §422].
Section 422 makes it illegal to willfully threaten to commit a crime that
will result in death or great bodily injury to another person. The new law
provides, however, that the act must have been committed with the specific
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intent to terrorize another person, or with reckless disregard of the risk of
terrorizing another [CAL. PENAL CODE §422]. Furthermore, to be prohibited
by Section 422, the result of the conduct must be: (1) to cause the other
person reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her, or his or her
immediate family's safety; (2) to cause the evacuation of a building, a place
of assembly, or a facility used in public transportation; (3) to interfere with
essential public services; or (4) to otherwise cause serious disruption of
public activities. Thus, the effect of the new law is to focus on the harm
done by the threats [See CAL. PENAL CODE §422]. Punishment for violation
of Chapter 1146 is imprisonment in any state prison for 16 months, or two or
three years as applicable under the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act
[Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §422 with CAL. PENAL CODE §18]. Inas-
much as the language of Chapter 1146 reflects that of the Model Penal Code
and the Brown Commission Report, it would appear that the intent of
Chapter 1146 is to prevent serious alarm caused by the acts of terrorists
[Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §422 with MODEL PENAL CODE §211.3, Status
of Section (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) and NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM
OF FED. CRIM. LAWS, FINAL REPORT OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF
FED. CRim. LAWS §1614, Comment (1971)]. This conclusion also would
appear reasonable in light of the recent wave of terrorist attacks on Califor-
nia utilities' installations [See Los Angeles Times, Apr. 19, 1977, § 1, at 2,
col. 5; Los Angeles Times, Apr. 12, 1977, §1, at 2, col. 5; Los Angeles
Times, Jan. 28, 1977, §1, at 3, col. 6].
A brief discussion of the specific language used in Chapter 1146 should
provide some insight into the possible construction of this new law. The
term "willfully" as used in Section 422 appears to require only a showing
that a defendant possessed a purpose or willingness to make the threat and
not to require proof of an intent to violate the law [Compare CAL. PENAL
CODE §422 with People v. Atkins, 53 Cal. App. 3d 348, 358, 125 Cal. Rptr.
855, 861 (1975) and People v. Mancha, 39 Cal. App. 3d 703, 722, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 392, 403-04 (1974) and CAL. PENAL CODE §7]. A threat, on the other
hand, may be defined as the communication of an intent to inflict physical or
other harm on any person or property [See People v. Massengale, 261 Cal.
App. 2d 758,765, 68 Cal. Rptr. 415,419-20 (1968); People v. Oppenheim-
er, 209 Cal. App. 2d 413, 422, 26 Cal. Rptr. 18, 25 (1962)]. Whether
words or phrases are harmless or threatening is determined by "the context
in which they are used, measured by the common experience of the society
in which they are used" [United States v. Pennell, 144 F. Supp. 317, 319
(N.D. Cal. 1956); see Roy v. United States, 416 P.2d 874, 878 (9th Cir.
1969)]. Thus, the phrase "willfully threatens" appears to require a showing
that the defendant purposefully communicated an intent to harm any person
or property [See CAL. PENAL CODE §422].
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Conviction under Section 422 also requires proof of a specific intent to
terrorize another, or commission of the proscribed act with reckless disre-
gard of the risk of terrorizing another. Since the use of the term "terrorize"
is new to the California Penal Code, Section 422.5 has defined the term as
meaning "to create a climate of fear and intimidation by means of threats of
violent action causing sustained fear for personal safety in order to achieve
social or political goals." This definition would appear to be consistent with
definitions of the term developed by other states with terrorist threat statutes
similar to the new California law [Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §§422,
422.5 with Armstrong v. Ellington, 312 F. Supp. 1119, 1126 (W.D. Tenn.
1970) and State v. Gunzelman, 210 Kan. 481, 489, 502 P.2d 705, 710
(1972) and State v. Schweppe, 306 Minn. 395, 401, 237 N.W.2d 609, 614
(1975)], and the meaning of the term as it is used in the Model Penal Code
[Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §§422, 422.5 with MODEL PENAL CODE
§211.3, Status of Section (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) and §211.3,
Comment (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960)].
As an alternative to the specific intent requirement of Chapter 1146,
Section 422 also extends criminal sanctions to terrorist threats if they are
made "with reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing another." The term
"reckless disregard" is not defined by Chapter 1146, but has been used in
previous California codes [See CAL. STATS. 1959, c. 1189, §1, at 3276;
CAL. STATS. 1941, c. 279, §1, at 1414]. Thus, an examination of cases
construing these other uses of the term may prove helpful. Generally, to
establish "reckless disregard," there must be an action that the perpetrator
knew or should have known was likely to cause harm [See Breceda v.
Gamsby, 267 Cal. App. 2d 167, 177, 72 Cal. Rptr. 832, 840 (1968)
(employment of workmen under dangerous conditions that can be guarded
against constitutes a reckless disregard for their safety)].
Additionally, a "reckless disregard" would appear to reflect a type of
conduct that is quasi-criminal in nature [People v. Young, 20 Cal. 2d 832,
837, 129 P.2d 353, 356 (1942) (reckless driving and negligent homicide)],
which is to say that the defendant was aware of the possible results, but
continued with his or her course of conduct [See People v. Allison, 101 Cal.
App. 2d Supp. 932, 934-35, 226 P.2d 85, 86 (1951) (reckless driving);
People v. Gomez, 59 Cal. App. 2d 417, 419-20, 138 P.2d 788, 789 (1943)
(negligent homicide in a vehicle)]. Furthermore, it appears that whether an
act is done with "reckless disregard" is a question of fact to be decided by
the jury [See Hastings v. Serleto, 61 Cal. App. 2d 672, 683, 143 P.2d 956,
961 (1943) (reckless driving); People v. Murray, 58 Cal. App. 2d 239, 244,
136 P.2d 389, 391 (1943) (negligent homicide in a vehicle)]. Thus, convic-
tion under Chapter 1146 for making the proscribed threats with reckless
disregard of the risk of terrorizing another would appear to require a
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showing that the defendant was aware, or should have been aware, of a
probable risk, yet ignored that probability and proceeded with his or her
course of conduct [Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §422 with Morgan v.
Southern Pacific Trans. Co., 37 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1011-12, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 695, 698 (1974) (negligence action in tort for damages) and People v.
Thurston, 212 Cal. App. 2d 713, 716, 28 Cal. Rptr. 254, 256 (1963)
(reckless driving) and People v. Schumacher, 194 Cal. App. 2d 335, 339-
40, 14 Cal. Rptr. 924, 926-27 (1961) (reckless driving)].
Although Chapter 1146 makes it a crime to communicate a threat directly,
the language of the new law apparently does not preclude prosecution for
threats indirectly communicated [See CAL. PENAL CODE §422]. It should be
noted, however, that the California Legislature considered, but did not enact
a related measure that would have specifically proscribed directly or indi-
rectly threatening any person with unlawful injury in order to force that
person to act or refrain from acting in performance of his or her vocational
or professional responsibilities [See SB 1129, 1977-78 Regular Session, as
amended, June 16, 1977]. It is not clear whether the failure to enact a
provision containing this language indicates an intent by the legislature not
to prohibit indirect threats, or a belief that the language incorporated in
Chapter 1146 includes a proscription of such threats. In support of the latter
interpretation, other states with threat statutes similar to California's have
found that to violate these laws the threat need not be communicated directly
in cases in which the threat is clear from the conduct of the defendant [State
v. Schweppe, 306 Minn. 395, 399-401, 237 N.W.2d 609, 612-14 (1975);
see Gurley v. United States, 308 A.2d 785, 786-87 (D.C. App. 1973); State
v. Lizotte, 256 A.2d 439, 440, 442 (Me. 1969)]. Consistent with these
cases, Chapter 1146 appears to focus on the effects of a defendant's actions
(i.e., reasonable fear, evacuation, public disruption) thereby apparently
indicating that the conduct sanctioned by Section 422 of the Penal Code is
that in which a threat to kill or to inflict great bodily injury is clear regardless
of how such a threat is communicated to an individual [See CAL. PENAL
CODE §422(a)-(d)]. Thus, the language of Chapter 1146 prohibits purpose-
fully communicating, either directly or indirectly, a threat to commit a crime
that will result in death or great bodily injury to another person [See CAL.
PENAL CODE §422].
Although similar statutes in other states have been constitutionally chal-
lenged on the basis of freedom of speech, vagueness, and overbreadth, these
laws have been consistently upheld [Masson v. Slaton, 320 F. Supp. 669,
673 (N.D. Georgia 1970); Lanthrip v. State, 235 Ga. 10, 218 S.E.2d 771,
773 (1975); State v. Gunzelman, 210 Kan. 481, 489, 502 P.2d 705, 710
(1972); State v. Hotham, 307 A.2d 185, 186 (Me. 1973)]. Based upon the
specific intent requirement of Chapter 1146, and the restrictive definition of
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 9
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"terrorize," it would appear that Chapter 1146, if challenged, will also be
found to be constitutional [Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §§422, 422.5 with
Masson v. Slaton, 320 F. Supp. 669, 672 (N.D. Georgia 1970) and Erlich
v. Municipal Court, 55 Cal. 2d 553, 559, 360 P.2d 334, 337, 11 Cal. Rptr.
758, 761 (1961) and In re Davis, 242 Cal. App. 2d 645, 664, 51 Cal. Rptr.
702, 715 (1966) and Lanthrip v. State, 235 Ga. 10, 218 S.E.2d 771, 772
(1975) and State v. Gunzelman, 210 Kan. 481, 502 P.2d 705, 710 (1972)
and State v. Hotham, 307 A.2d 185, 186 (Maine 1973)].
In summary, Chapter 1146 makes it unlawful to willfully threaten to
commit certain crimes for the purpose of terrorizing another or in reckless
disregard of the risk of terrorizing another [CAL. PENAL CODE §422].
Furthermore, the result of any of these acts must be to cause "another
person reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or hers or their immediate
family's safety," or to cause the evacuation of certain buildings or places,
or interfere with essential public services or other public activities [See CAL.
PENAL CODE §422]. Assuming Chpater 1146 will survive any constitutional
challenge, it would appear to provide California with an effective tool to
deal with terrorist threats.
See Generally:
1) Annot., 58 A.L.R. 3d 533 (terrorist threat statutes) (1974).
2) Annot., 93 A.L.R. 2d 304 (bomb hoaxes and false reports) (1964).
Crimes; witnesses
Penal Code §137 (amended).
AB 269 (Greene); STATS 1977, Ch 67
Support: California Attorney General; California District Attorneys' As-
sociation; California Peace Officers' Association
Chapter 67 has amended Section 137 of the Penal Code to make it a
misdemeanor to knowingly induce a person to give false testimony or to
withhold true testimony [CAL. PENAL CODE § 137(c)]. In addition, it remains
a felony to offer, promise to give, or give a bribe to a witness or a person
about to be called as a witness [CAL. PENAL CODE § 137(a)], or to attempt by
force, threat of force, or use of fraud to induce a person to give false
testimony or withhold true testimony [CAL. PENAL CODE §137(b)]. Thus,
whereas it remains a more serious crime to bribe a witness or to attempt to
induce a change of testimony by force or fraud [CAL. PENAL CODE § 137(a)-
(b)], Chapter 67 now additionally makes it illegal to knowingly induce a
witness by any other means to change his or her testimony [See CAL. PENAL
CODE §137(c)].
The meaning of "induce," as used in Section 137(c), appears to be
unclear. It seems uncertain whether Section 137(c) is violated only when a
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person successfully induces a witness to give false or withhold true tes-
timony, or whether an attempt at such inducement is sufficient for a
violation of this subsection. Pursuant to Chapter 67, Section 137(c) provides
that "every person who knowingly induces another person to give false
testimony . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor" (emphasis added). In contrast,
Section 137(b) uses the language "every person who attempts by force or
threat of force or by the use of fraud to induce any person to give false
testimony . . . is guilty of a felony" (emphasis added). This difference in
language appears to imply that a prospective witness must actually give false
or withhold true testimony and that merely an unsuccessful attempt to
induce this result is insufficient for conviction under Section 137(c). The
Attorney General of California has noted that the phrase "to induce" means
"among other things, 'to influence to an act or course of conduct' " [58 Op.
ATr'Y GEN. 320 (1975)]. Arguably, the inference may be drawn that a
completed course of conduct is required. Other cases have used broader
definitions allowing the inference that only an attempted interference is
required, but the facts of these cases all involved a completed rather than an
attempted interference [See IBEW v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 697, 701-02
(1951); Aluminum Extrusion Co. v. Soule Steel Co., 260 F. Supp. 221, 224
(C.D. Cal. 1966); People v. Drake, 151 Cal. App. 2d 28, 34, 38-39, 310
P.2d 997, 1000, 1003 (1957)]. Indeed, the historical purpose of Section
137, which is to prevent corrupt interference with the administration of
justice [People v. McAllister, 99 Cal. App. 37, 40, 277 P. 1082, 1084
(1929)], would appear to suggest that only an attempted interference is
necessary. On the other hand, the mere solicitation of perjury is already
prohibited by Section 653f of the Penal Code. Thus, based on the contrast-
ing language of Sections 137(b) and 137(c) and the historical usage of the
word "induce," it appears that there is a strong argument to construe
Section 137(c) to require a showing that false testimony was given or true
testimony was withheld.
If a person succeeds in inducing another to give false testimony by using
force, threat of force or fraud, Section 663 of the Penal Code would appear
to allow prosecution of this act as an attempt, which is punishable as a
felony pursuant to Section 137(b), since a completed inducement necessari-
ly involves such an attempt. Section 137(c), however, indicates that the
successful inducement of a prospective witness to change his or her tes-
timony is a misdemeanor. Thus, the language of Section 137(b) seems to
indicate that the attempted inducement by use of force, threat of force or use
of fraud is a felony, whereas the completed inducement, pursuant to Section
137(c), is a misdemeanor. The apparent intent of Chapter 67, however, is to
treat any inducement of a witness, attempted or successful, as a felony if
done with force, threat of force or by the use of fraud [See CAL. PENAL
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 9
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CODE §137(b)]. Any other successful inducement knowingly made would
appear to be a misdemeanor under Section 137(c). Thus, Chapter 67 would
now appear to provide a deterrent to any conduct that by design induces a
witness to give false testimony or withhold true testimony and to clarify the
language governing such conduct [See CAL. PENAL CODE §137].
See Generally:
1) 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Crimes Against Governmental Authority §§815, 816,
826 (bribery of witnesses) (1963), §815 (force or threat of force) (Supp. 1975).
Crimes; cohabiting persons-domestic violence
Penal Code §273.5 (new); §273d (amended).
SB 691 (Marks); STATS 1977, Ch 912
Support: National Organization of Women
Chapter 912 has amended Section 273d of, and added Section 273.5 to
the Penal Code to separate provisions relating to child abuse and wife
beating, respectively. In addition, the provisions of Section 273d (now
Section 273.5), which formerly made it a felony for a husband to beat his
wife [CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §166, at - ] have been amended to
prohibit such conduct by either spouse or by cohabiting persons of the
opposite sex [CAL. PENAL CODE §273.5].
Under California law, in order for a police officer to make an arrest
without a warrant, the crime must either have been committed in his or her
presence or the officer must have reasonable cause for believing that the
person to be arrested has committed a felony [CAL. PENAL CODE §836].
Although "wife beating" necessarily includes a battery [See CAL. PENAL
CODE §§243, 273.5], such an offense is not a felony unless the victim has
suffered "serious bodily injury," which is defined as a "serious impair-
ment of physical condition" [CAL. PENAL CODE §243 (emphasis added)].
Section 273.5, on the other hand, provides that it is a felony to inflict
"corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition," which is defined as a
wound or other injury to the body caused by external violence [Compare
CAL. PENAL CODE §273.5 with People v. Burns, 88 Cal. App. 2d 867, 873,
200 P.2d 134, 137-38 (1948)]. Thus, a police officer at the scene of a
domestic disturbance who is able to observe such wounds or injuries on an
individual and has reason to believe that they were inflicted by the person's
spouse or the person with whom the injured individual is cohabiting,
apparently is now allowed to make an arrest pursuant to Section 273.5 for
the protection of the battered individual [See People v. Cameron, 53 Cal.
App. 3d 786, 792-93, 126 Cal. Rptr. 44, 47-48 (1975); CAL. PENAL CODE
§836].
Section 273.5 also punishes as a felony the beating of a person of the
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opposite sex with whom one is "cohabiting." Furthermore, this section
makes it clear that it is not necessary to hold oneself out as being married in
order to constitute cohabitation. It is well settled that the term "cohabita-
tion" has the meaning of "living together as husband and wife" [Kusior v.
Silver, 54 Cal. 2d 603, 611, 354 P.2d 657, 661, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129, 133
(1960); Louis v. Louis, 7 Cal. App. 3d 851, 852, 86 Cal. Rptr. 834, 835
(1970)], while holding oneself out to be married has been defined as
representing oneself to the public as being married, which includes, for
example, using the same last name on a joint checking account or having a
joint listing in the telephone directory [Lang v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.
App. 3d 852, 859, 126 Cal. Rptr. 122, 126-27 (1975)]. Thus it would seem
that the legislature intends the term "cohabitation" to be given a broad
interpretation by the courts.
Chapter 912 has been enacted in an apparent response to the rising
number of couples who are living together without being married [Marvin v.
Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 665 n.1, 557 P.2d 106, 109 n.1, 134 Cal. Rptr.
815, 818 n.1 (1976)] and to the comments of the court in People v.
Cameron [53 Cal. App. 3d 786, 126 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1975)], which suggested
that the legislature amend former Section 273d, now Section 273.5, to
include both spouses within its protection [Id. at 797, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 51].
Consequently, Section 273.5 would appear to broaden the prohibition
against wife beating by also punishing as a felony any person who inflicts a
traumatic injury on his or her spouse or upon the person of the opposite sex
with whom they are cohabiting and to enhance the enforcement of this law
by apparently allowing a police officer to make a warrantless arrest for
violations of this section not committed in his or her presence.
See Generally:
I) 1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Crimes Against the Person, §274 (injury to the wife)
(1963).
Crimes; arson-solicitation and punishment
Penal Code §456 (new); §653f (amended).
AB 27 (Arnett); STATS 1977, Ch 163
Support: California Attorney General; California District Attorneys' As-
sociation; California Fire Chiefs' Association; California Peace Officers'
Association; Farmers Insurance Group; State Bar of California
In an apparent response to the growing problem of arson in California
[See Assemblyman Dixon Arnett, Press Release, No. 77-6, January 17,
1977], Chapter 163 has been enacted to make it a crime to solicit another
person to commit arson [CAL. PENAL CODE §653f]. Under prior law,
solicitation of arson was not, of itself, a crime [See CAL. STATS. 1976, c.
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1139, §263 at - ]. If, however, the party solicited agreed to commit the
crime and there was some overt act in furtherance of the agreement, such
conduct is sufficient to prove conspiracy [CAL. PENAL CODE §§182, 184].
Furthermore, if the solicited offense is completed, the solicitor is punishable
as a principal in the crime [CAL. PENAL CODE §31]. The crime of solicita-
tion, on the other hand, is separate and distinct from conspiracy since
solicitation is punishable regardless of actions of the solicited party [1 B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Solicitation §§76-77 (1963)].
Penal Code Section 653f makes it a felony/misdemeanor to solicit another
person to commit specified crimes and, in addition to imprisonment, sub-
jects persons convicted under its provisions to a fine not to exceed $5,000.
Chapter 163 has amended Section 653f to include arson in the list of
offenses for which it is a crime to solicit and also provides that the fine for
solicitation of the enumerated offenses may now exceed $5,000 if such
amount could have been assessed for the commission of the completed
crime. Since Section 456 has been added to the Penal Code to allow the
imposition of a fine of up to $50,000, in addition to the terms of imprison-
ment already prescribed by law, for felony arson convictions, it would
appear that this maximum fine may now be assessed against a person
convicted of solicitation of arson [See CAL. PENAL CODE §§456, 653f].
Although Penal Code Section 653f does not define the term "arson," it
generally is said to include the burning of dwellings, trailer coaches, and
other buildings [See People v. Chavez, 50 Cal. 2d 778, 787, 329 P.2d 907,
912-13 (1958); CAL. PENAL CODE §§447a, 448a; 1 B. WrrKiN, CALIFORNIA
CRIMES, Crimes Against Property §464 (1963)]. The burning of personal
property, however, has been held not to be arson [People v. Nichols, 3 Cal.
3d 150, 161, 474 P.2d 673, 680, 89 Cal. Rptr. 721, 728 (1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 910 (1971); 1 B. WrKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Crimes
Against Property §463 (Supp. 1975)] and the sections proscribing malicious
burning specifically provide that they apply either -to objects "not the
subject of arson" [CAL. PENAL CODE §449b] or only to the burning of crops,
grass, or timber [CAL. PENAL CODE §449c]. Therefore, although Chapter
163 makes it a crime to solicit another person to commit arson [CAL. PENAL
CODE §653f], and increases the maximum assessable fine for felony arson
convictions and solicitation of arson to $50,000 [CAL. PENAL CODE §§456,
653f], its provisions are apparently limited to the burning of buildings.
See Generally:
I) 1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Crimes Against Property §§463-469 (1963), §§463-469
(Supp. 1975).
2) 1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Solicitation §§76, 77 (1963).
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Crimes; burglary, arson, and discharge of firearms-house cars
and campers
Penal Code §§246, 447a, 459 (amended).
SB 305 (Johnson); STATS 1977, Ch 690
Support: California Attorney General; California Highway Patrol;
California Organization of Police and Sheriffs; California Peace Officer's
Association
Chapter 690 has been enacted to specifically include inhabited campers,
as defined by Section 243 of the Vehicle Code, and house cars, as defined
by Section 362 of the Vehicle Code, within the list of structures that can be
the subject of a felony discharge of a firearm, a burglary, or an arson.
Formerly, Section 246 and 459 of the Penal Code provided that a vehicle,
inter alia, could be the subject of a felony discharge of a firearm or of a
burglary, respectively [See CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1119, §1, at -; CAL.
STATS. 1947, c. 1052, §1, at 2452], which arguably included campers and
house cars within these provisions [See CAL. VEH. CODE §670]. Section 246
has been amended to specifically provide that for a house car or camper to
be the subject of a felony discharge of a firearm, it must be inhabited, which
means that the vehicle must'be currently in use as a dwelling, although not
necessarily occupied [CAL. PENAL CODE §246]. Similarly, Section 459 has
been amended to provide that for a camper to be the subject of a burglary, it
must also be in use as a dwelling, but the new law does not require that a
house car be inhabited to be included in this section [See CAL. PENAL CODE
§459].
The malicious burning of motor vehicles is proscribed by Section 449a of
the Penal Code, and is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for 16
months, two, or three years [CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 18, 449a]. Chapter 690,
however, has now added inhabited campers and inhabited house cars to the
list of structures that can be the subject of arson, which is punishable by
imprisonment in a state prison for two, three, or four years [CAL. PENAL
CODE §447a]. In summary, Chapter 690 has increased the penalty for the
malicious burning of a house car or camper, if inhabited, and has limited the
situations in which campers can be the subject of a burglary, and in which
house cars and campers can be the subject of felony discharge of a firearm.
See Generally:
1) 1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Crimes Against Property §475 (vehicles, highways and
bridges, etc.) (1963), §§451-66 (nature of crime-burglary, arson) (Supp. 1975).
Crimes; brandishing a firearm
Penal Code §417 (amended).
AB 405 (Maddy); STATS 1977, Ch 667
Support: California Association of Highway Patrol Officers; California
District Attorneys' Association; California Peace Officers' Association;
A- Pacific Law Journal Vol. 9
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California State Employees' Association; California Probation, Parole
and Correctional Association
Opposition: State of California Public Defender
Section 417 of the Penal Code makes it a misdemeanor, except in cases of
self-defense, to draw or exhibit in the presence of another a loaded or
unloaded firearm or any other deadly weapon in a rude, angry or threatening
manner, or to use such a weapon unlawfully in any fight or quarrel [CAL.
PENAL CODE §417(a)]. Chapter 667 has amended Section 417 by adding a
provision making it a felony to brandish a firearm in such a manner in the
immediate presence of a peace officer [CAL. PENAL CODE §417(b)]. Thus, it
is a more serious crime to draw or exhibit a firearm, whether loaded or
unloaded, in a rude, angry or threatening manner in the immediate presence
of a peace officer if: (1) the person knows or reasonably should know that
the other is a peace officer in the performance of his or her duties; and (2)
the peace officer is actually engaged in the performance of his or her duties
[See CAL. PENAL CODE §417(b)]. Punishment for violation of Section
417(b) is imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or in a
state prison for 16 months, or two or three years pursuant to the Uniform
Determinate Sentencing Act [See CAL. PENAL CODE §18].
To be liable under the felony provision of Section 417, a defendant must
have exhibited a firearm in the immediate presence of the peace officer
[CAL. PENAL CODE §417(b)]. Although not defined by prior cases prose-
cuted under Section 417, the term "immediate presence" has been con-
strued in relation to the crime of robbery [CAL. PENAL CODE §211] to mean
at least an area within which the victim could reasonably be expected to
exercise some physical control over his or her property [People v. Bauer,
241 Cal. App. 2d 632, 642, 50 Cal. Rptr. 687, 693 (1966)]. In contrast, the
phrase "in the presence of a peace officer" generally has been broadly
construed to depend on the circumstances of each case and includes percep-
tions by the use of all the senses [People v. Goldberg, 2 Cal. App. 3d 30,
33, 82 Cal. Rptr. 314, 316 (1969)]. Thus, the language "immediate pres-
ence" would appear to require that the brandishing of a firearm occur within
physical proximity of the peace officer [See CAL. PENAL CODE §417(b)].
As used in Section 417, the term "peace officer" refers to any of the
following persons provided they are regularly employed and paid in their
capacities as: sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, undersheriffs, police, marshalls,
deputy marshalls, constables, deputy constables, California Highway Pa-
trolmen, California State Police, certain members of the California National
Guard, members of state university or college police departments, and
correctional, parole and probation officers [See CAL. PENAL CODE
§§417(b), 830.1, 830.2(a)-(e), 830.5]. Apparently the term "peace officer"
does not include the particular officers enumerated in Section 830.3, securi-
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ty officers, reserve or auxiliary sheriffs, or reserve or auxiliary city police-
men [See CAL. PENAL CODE §§417(b), 830.3, 830.4, 830.6]. Thus, where-
as it is already a misdemeanor to brandish a firearm or any other deadly
weapon in the presence of any other person [CAL. PENAL CODE §417(a)],
Chapter 667 now provides a stiffer penalty for drawing or exhibiting a
firearm in the immediate presence of a peace officer who is acting in the line
of duty [CAL. PENAL CODE §417(b)].
See Generally:
1) 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare §621 (disturb-
ing the peace) (1963).
Crimes; unlawful flight by a motor vehicle operator
Vehicle Code §2800.1 (new); §§40000.7, 42001 (amended).
SB 200 (Presley); STATS 1977, Ch 1104
Support: California District Attorneys' Association; California Highway
Patrol; California Peace Officers' Association
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1104, there apparently was no law
specifically prohibiting the high speed pursuit situation between an arresting
police officer and a driver who was willfully fleeing from the officer [See
CAL. VEH. CODE §§2800, 23103, 23104]. Section 2800 of the Vehicle Code
is limited to disobedience of "traffic officers," which is defined as any
member of the California Highway Patrol, or any peace officer who is on
duty for the primary purpose of enforcing the provisions of the "Accidents
and Accident Reports" and "Rules of the Road" division of the Vehicle
Code [Compare CAL. VEH. CODE §2800 with CAL. VEH. CODE §625 and
CAL. PENAL CODE §830]. Further, the sections of the Vehicle Code pertain-
ing to reckless driving require a showing of "willful or wanton disregard for
the safety of persons or property" [CAL. VEH. CODE §23103; see CAL.
VEH. CODE §23104].
As supported by the California Peace Officers' Association, Chapter 1104
adds Section 2800.1 to the Vehicle Code in an apparent effort to deter high
speed pursuits [See Letter from A. Zaremberg, California Peace Officers'
Association, to State Senator R. Presley, December 14, 1976, (copy on file
at the Pacific Law Journal] by making it unlawful for a motor vehicle
operator to flee from a peace officer pursuing in a marked car [See CAL.
VEH. CODE §2800.1]. Thus, Chapter 1104 provides that once a motorist has
heard a siren and has seen at least one red light emanating from a distinc-
tively marked or painted vehicle that is operated by a member of the
California Highway Patrol or any peace officer of any sheriff's or city police
department, the motorist is guilty of a misdemeanor if he or she, with the
intent to evade the officer: (1) willfully disregards such a siren and flashing
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light; and (2) flees, or otherwise attempts to elude, the pursuing peace
officer's motor vehicle [CAL. VEH. CODE §2800.11. A further requirement
of Section 2800.1 is that the pursuing officer must be wearing a complete,
distinctive peace officer's uniform and appropriate badge [CAL. VEH. CODE
§2800.1]. In addition, the language "every person who. . . hears a siren
and sees at least one lighted lamp exhibiting a red light" [CAL. VEH. CODE
§2800.1] would appear to require expressly that the fleeing motorist actual-
ly hear the siren and see the red light, rather than be in a position where he
or she should have heard one and seen the other [See CAL. VEH. CODE
§2800.1]. Arguably, the language "at least one lighted lamp exhibiting a
red light" would appear to encompass both solid and flashing red lights
[See CAL. VEH. CODE §2800.1]. Subsequent language in Section 2800.1,
however, refers to the willful disregard of "such siren and flashing light"
(emphasis added). Thus, it would appear to be ambiguous whether the
willful disregard of a solid burning red light, emanating from the appropriate
vehicle, would be a violation of Section 2800.1. Furthermore, the require-
ment that the patrol car be distinctively marked apparently would make
Chapter 1104 inapplicable to high speed pursuits by the specified officers in
unmarked cars [See CAL. VEH. CODE §2800.1].
Referring to the language of Section §2800.1, it appears that the term
"willfully" is afforded the same meaning as provided for in the Penal Code
[Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §7 with CAL. VEH. CODE §§2800, 23103,
27156 and People v. Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929, 932, 934, 538 P.2d 237,
239, 241, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109, 111, 113 (1975) and People v. Schumacher,
194 Cal. App. 2d 335, 340, 14 Cal. Rptr. 924, 927 (1961) and People v.
McNutt, 40 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 835, 837-38, 105 P.2d 657, 658-59
(1940)]. Thus, the term "willfully disregards" apparently will require a
showing that the fleeing motorist simply possessed a purpose or willingness
to ignore the officer's signals and will not require proof of any intent to
violate the law [See CAL. PENAL CODE §7]. The requirement remains,
however, that the motorist act with the intent to evade the pursuing officer
[CAL. VEH. CODE §2800.1].
Procedurally, unless a motorist refused to give his or her written promise
to appear or demanded an immediate appearance before a magistrate, the
pursuing officer is apparently not authorized to take a fleeing motorist
before such magistrate, but rather seems limited to giving the motorist a
written notice to appear in court [Compare CAL. VEH. CODE §40500 with
CAL. VEH. CODE §§40302, 40303]. Punishment upon a first conviction of a
violation of Vehicle Code Section 2800.1 is a fine not exceeding $50 or
imprisonment in a county jail for five days or less [CAL. VEH. CODE
§42001(b)]. A second conviction within one year is punishable by a fine not
to exceed $100 or by imprisonment in a county jail not in excess of ten days,
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or by both [CAL. VEH. CODE §42001(b)]. A third or any subsequent
conviction within a one year period is punishable by a fine not exceeding
$500 or by imprisonment in a county jail for a period not exceeding six
months, or by both [CAL. VEH. CODE §42001(b)].
See Generally:
1) Comment, California's Ineffective Reckless Driving Statute, 14 HASTINGS L.J. 415 (1962-
63) (problems with obtaining convictions under the reckless driving statute).
Crimes; unlawful lodging in vehicles
Penal Code §647 (amended).
SB 134 (Johnson); STATS 1977, Ch 426
Support: California District Attorneys' Association; California Highway
Patrol; California Peace Officers' Association
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 426, it was unclear whether it was
unlawful to sit or sleep in an unlocked vehicle without the owner's or
possessor's permission, or to commit some other act of trespass in a vehicle
[See CAL. STATS. 1971, c. 1581, §1 at 3188; CAL. VEH. CODE §§10852,
10853]. Chapter 426 amends the provision of Section 647 of the Penal Code
that relates to lodging in buildings, and provides that, in addition, lodging in
any vehicle without the permission of the owner or the person entitled to
possession is disorderly conduct, which is punishable as a misdemeanor
[CAL. PENAL CODE §647(i)]. The term "vehicle" apparently includes such
things as buses, motor trucks, passenger vehicles, trailers and trolley
coaches [See CAL. VEH. CODE §§233, 410, 415, 465, 630, 650, 670] and
apparently excludes such devices as trains, cable cars, [See CAL. VEH.
CODE §670] and airplanes [12 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 28, 32 (1948)].
Lodging in a building or place without the consent of the owner, or one
entitled to possession or in control thereof, may be illustrated by a person
sleeping in an apartment without permission of the tenant [People v. Lyons,
18 Cal. App. 3d 760, 773, 96 Cal. Rptr. 76, 85 (1971)]. Extending this
definition to vehicles, it would now appear to be illegal to sleep in a vehicle
without the owner's permission [See CAL. PENAL CODE §647(i)]. Whether a
mere temporary occupation of a vehicle is covered by this new law depends
on the definition of the term "lodge." The verb "lodge," in its normal
usage, means to rest in a place or to rest or dwell for a time [WEBSTER'S
NEW" TwENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 1063 (unabridged 2nd ed. 1971)].
This definition would appear to be particularly applicable to vehicles as used
in Section 647(i) in light of the fact that Chapter 426 apparently was
introduced in response to a Butte County Municipal Court case involving an
inebriated person entering and sitting in an unlocked car and searching
through the glove compartment for a match to light his cigarette [See People
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v. Lewis, CR 1909 (Chico Mun. Ct. Dec. 1, 1976); see also letter from
Judge A. Houghton, Chico Mun. Ct., Chico, Cal. to State Senator R.
Johnson, 1st Senatorial District, Cal., December 15, 1976 (copy on file at
the Pacific Law Journal)]. Thus, Chapter 426 appears to extend a criminal
sanction to such a temporary trespass in a vehicle.
See Generally:
I) 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare §617 (loiter-
ing and trespassing) (Supp. 1975).
Crimes; hit and run skiing
Penal Code §653i (new); §602 (amended).
AB 956 (Waters); STATS 1977, Ch 870
Support: Sierra Ski Areas' Association
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 870, there apparently was no law
making it illegal to leave the scene of a skiing accident. Chapter 870 adds
Section 653i to the Penal Code to make it an infraction for a person who is
involved in a skiing accident to leave the scene of the accident if he or she
knows or has reason to believe that anyone else involved in the accident is in
need of medical and other assistance, except to notify the proper authorities
or to obtain assistance [CAL. PENAL CODE §653i]. In addition, Chapter 870
amends Section 602 of the Penal Code to make it a misdemeanor to willfully
commit a trespass by knowingly skiing in an area, or on a ski trail, that is
closed to the public and on which signs have been posted to indicate such
closure [CAL. PENAL CODE §602(q)]. Punishment for violation of Section
653i (hit and run skiing) is a fine not to exceed $1,000, whereas punishment
for violation of Section 602(q) (misdemeanor trespass) is imprisonment in a
county jail for not more than six months or a fine not greater than $500 or
both [See CAL. PENAL CODE §§19, 602(q)].
Inasmuch as the language and apparent purpose of Section 653i, concern-
ing hit and run skiing, are similar to the language and purpose of the Vehicle
Code section governing hit and run driving [Compare CAL. PENAL CODE
§653i with CAL. VEH. CODE §20001], reference to the latter may prove
helpful in defining the terms used in Section 653i. By way of analogy, it
would appear that in addition to the normal involvement in a skiing accident
by means of personal contact in a collision, a person may be "involved" in
such an accident if he or she forces another into a position of danger or is
instrumental in causing the accident (Cf. People v. Bammes, 265 Cal. App.
2d 626, 631, 71 Cal. Rptr. 415, 419 (1968) (involvement in a hit and run
driving accident); People v. Sell, 96 Cal. App. 2d 521, 523-24, 215 P.2d
771, 772 (1950) (involvement in a hit and run driving accident)]. Further,
Section 653i expressly requires that the defendant have knowledge of a need
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for aid, or reason to believe it is needed. Again, by way of comparison to the
Vehicle Code, it would appear reasonable to infer that violation of Section
653i would require that a defendant have actual knowledge of personal
injury to another resulting from the accident or constructive knowledge of
such injury from the fact that the personal injury was visible and obvious or
that the accident was so serious that a reasonable person would assume that
there must have been resulting injuries [Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §653i
with CAL. VEH. CODE §20001 and People v. Carter, 243 Cal. App. 2d 239,
241, 52 Cal. Rptr. 207, 208 (1966)]. Thus, Section 653i of the Penal Code
apparently makes it illegal for a person who collides with another skier or is
instrumental in causing another to have a skiing accident, to leave the scene
of this accident if such a person has actual or constructive knowledge that an
individual has sustained personal injury as a result of the incident.
With reference to the language of Section 602(q), making it illegal to
willfully commit a trespass by knowingly skiing in an area marked as
closed, the term "knowingly skiing" appears to require only that the
defendant had knowledge that the area or trail on which he or she was skiing
was closed to the public and does not require any knowledge of the
unlawfulness of such an act [See CAL. PENAL CODE §§7, 602(q)]. Thus, it
would appear that a violation of Section 602(q) of the Penal Code would
require a showing that a sign prohibiting skiing on the trail was clearly
positioned, that the defendant saw the sign, understood that the area was
closed to the public, and that he or she then proceeded to ski there anyway
[See CAL. PENAL CODE §6 02(q)].
Enforcement of either Section 653i or 602(q) may prove difficult inas-
much as police do not patrol the ski slopes. Nevertheless, Chapter 870
appears to take steps toward requiring reasonable conduct by skiers on the
slopes when they are involved in an accident, and attempts to provide a
deterrent to skiing on trails marked as closed [See CAL PENAL CODE §§602,
653i].
See Generally:
1) 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare §646 (in-
volvement in an accident), §650 (knowledge) (1963); §646 (involvement in an accident),
§650 (knowledge) (Supp. 1975).
2) Annot., 23 A.L.R. 3d 497 (knowledge of an accident) (1969).
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